In recent years the practice of dowry has witnessed sharp changes in south India.
INTRODUCTION
The practice of dowry, a transfer of resources from the family of a bride to a groom or a groom's family at the time of marriage continues unabated in India. 1 In recent years there has been an increase in the amount of dowry, a spread in the incidence of dowry and changes in the nature of dowry. In much of north India where the practice of dowry has a long history, dowry amounts have spiralled upward. In the south and other regions where the practice was restricted to upper castes/classes it has spread to become an all caste/class phenomenon (Kapadia, 1993; Srinivas, 1984) . 2 According to a countrywide survey conducted by the All India Democratic Women's Association (AIDWA) in 2001, the dowry system has become a pan Indian phenomenon, permeating 'every section, class, caste and religion and even the more egalitarian tribal communities, particularly during the past one and a half decades.' (Taking on dowry, Frontline 19(23) November 2002). 3 Real dowry payments appear to have risen sharply and several articles in the academic literature and the popular press have commented on the increase in the 'going-rate' for eligible bachelors (see Srinivasan, 2005) .
While the scarcity of data on dowry payments precludes a systematic temporal analysis of real (removing price and wealth effects) increases in dowries, there are some figures which support the claim of rising dowries. For instance, based on a study of dowry transactions in Delhi, Paul (1985) shows that average real dowry payments
The nature of dowry has also evolved over time. Till recently, at least in south India, dowry was viewed as a voluntary system of largely token amounts of cash or gifts in kind. The modern avatar of dowry is perceived to be extractive and involves the transfer of large amounts of cash, gold and consumer goods (Kapadia, 1993; Srinivas, 1984; Srinivasan, 2005) .
The social consequences associated with the current form of dowry practised in India are alarming. 5 Between 1999-2003 the National Crime Records Bureau of the Government of India reported approximately 6,000-7,000 dowry-related deaths every year and about 43,000-50,000 cases of mental and physical torture. The dowry burden has a bearing on household consumption and investment decisions as parents may under-invest in a daughter in order to save money for her dowry. Based on a study in rural south India, Srinivasan (2005) finds that the expectation of a large dowry payment tops the list of causes for the undesirability of daughters. The expected dowry burden influences decisions regarding the number of daughters and is the primary justification for sex selective abortion and female infanticide. While women may suffer and experience life-threatening consequences, it is not uncommon for women to argue in favour of dowry. A recent survey conducted by the Tamil Nadu Women's Development Corporation revealed that despite awareness of the potential link between female infanticide and dowry, only 23 percent of the women belonging to self-help groups were in favour of abolishing dowry. Srinivasan's (2005) work also indicates the same pattern. Almost all the women in the village that she studied were in favour of dowry. They pointed out that a large dowry was essential to be married to a 'good' man; it raised their value and contributed to their marital happiness and security. 7 They also viewed dowry as their share of parental property (streedhanam and pre-mortem inheritance), a gift for their 5 The practice of dowry was made illegal in India as early as 1961 (the law was amended in 1984 and 1986) . However, more than forty years hence, the practice of dowry thrives and as indicated above has spread and increased. 6 While increase in dowry may be one of the main reasons for sex selective abortion and female infanticide, others are of the view that the resulting shortage of girls may reverse the increase in dowry.
One of the early proponents of this view was Dharma Kumar (1983a & b) , who argued that sex selective abortion would ensure that only wanted girls were born and therefore they would be treated well. In addition, the shortage of brides would lead to the practice of dowry being replaced by bride price and raise the status of women. 7 An AIDWA (2003) survey on issues surrounding dowry reports a similar pattern. Of the 173 girls surveyed in Tamil Nadu, 104 felt that a dowry was essential in order for them to be treated with respect in their marital homes.
happiness, and expected their parents to provide a dowry. 8 Overall, in the context of a patrilineal inheritance system, a woman's demand for dowry may be seen as a way of asserting entitlements in anticipation of the withdrawal of post-marriage material support from her natal family and as a means of enabling her to negotiate status in her marital family.
This paper is motivated by the spread of dowry, its negative consequences for women and the continued support for dowry in terms of its perception as a source of security and respect for women. While the expectation of large dowries may have several undesirable consequences for women, do they at the same time translate into higher welfare for women who receive generous dowries? Based on qualitative and quantitative information gathered from a village study in Tamil Nadu in south India, this paper examines the link between dowry and domestic violence. 9 This paper is concerned with discussing the various channels through which dowry may influence domestic violence and establishing whether, after controlling for several relevant aspects, there is a link between the amount of dowry and domestic violence. We rely on qualitative and quantitative information to develop a characterization of domestic violence and to develop hypotheses about the manner in which dowry and various other socio-economic attributes may exert an influence on violence. Thereafter, based on our knowledge of the context and the quantitative information we implement an econometric strategy to test the various hypotheses.
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8 Dowry is often regarded as streedhanam (female property), which according to Tambiah (1973: 86) 'a woman received from her parents and relatives before and at marriage'…. 'over which a woman exercised dominion independently of her husband'. In the absence of inheritance rights for women Kishwar (1989 a & b) and Oldenberg (2002) argue that dowry may be justified and should be regarded as a pro-woman institution. While this notion of dowry has been disputed (see Agarwal, 1994) , recent developments such as the amended Hindu Succession Act (1956) , 2005 that ensure equal inheritance rights for daughters, if effectively implemented, may be expected to weaken the role of dowry as a daughter's share of family property (see Agarwal, The Hindu, September 25, 2005) . 9 Domestic violence is an important aspect of a woman's welfare and has severe health and social consequences for women. We provide a more detailed discussion of domestic violence later on in the text. 10 There are several papers on India and on other countries which have explored the empirical link between domestic violence and various socio-economic attributes. Studies on India are ICRW (1999, 2000, 2002) , Panda and Agarwal (2005) , Sen (1999) , Martin et al. (1999) , Karlekar (1998) . There are a few empirical explorations that combine qualitative and quantitative information and focus on the link between dowry and women's welfare. Our paper contributes to this latter strand of the literature. Examples include Jejeebhoy (1998) and Bloch and Rao (2002) . Bloch and Rao (2002) use data from a neighboring Indian state to examine the link between domestic violence and dowry. However, the main focus of their work is on the use of violence as a method for extracting additional transfers from the wife's natal family. The motivation and spirit of our paper is closest to the work of Zhang and Chan (1999) who focus on the role of dowry in influencing women's welfare in Taiwan.
This paper is organized as follows. The following section provides a description of the study area and a discussion on marriage, dowry and other related social norms in the area under study. Section 3 characterizes domestic violence and develops our hypotheses. Section 4 outlines an empirical specification. Section 5 discusses the data and our econometric estimates. Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
THE CONTEXT OF THE STUDY
The study is based in a small agrarian village (210 households) in Salem district in Tamil Nadu state in south India. 11 Agriculture is the main occupation and it is one of the few villages in the district to benefit from a major irrigation (Mettur dam) project.
It is a multi-caste village and includes three of the major castes of Salem district, namely Vanniyars, Vellala Gounders and Dalits. Vanniyars are the numerically dominant caste in the study village (as in the district). They account for 58 percent of households followed by Pavalam Katti (PK) Gounders (22 percent), Dalits (nine percent), and Kongu Vellala (KV) Gounders (eight percent). 12 In terms of social hierarchy, KV comes first, followed by PK and Vanniyars. Dalits occupy the lowest position. Over the last couple of years a few families have embraced Christianity, however, due to the risk of social ostracism and loss of benefits from affirmative action policies, some continue to report themselves as Hindus.
The distribution of land, a key asset, is highly skewed. Gounders who account for 30 percent of households own more than half the total agricultural land. The average land size is about 1.6 acres. Among Vanniyar households, 61 percent are landless while Dalits and other castes are landless. The average monthly household income is Rs.1,500, which is about the average for villages in this region of the state.
Most families from all castes own their houses and the homestead land (on which they 11 The district, block and the study village were purposively selected. According to the 2001 Census, district Salem has one of the lowest female-male 0-6 sex ratios in the country suggesting that daughter elimination is widespread. Within Salem, Idapadi block was selected as it reported a high incidence of female infanticide. Within the block we chose a village that displayed caste and class variations while at the same time exhibiting an average level of socio-economic development. The study village is multi-class and multi-caste-with three of the major castes of Salem district. Kinship arrangements including marriage and dowry practices in the village are typical of the region. 12 KV and PK are sub-castes of the Vellala Gounder caste.
are built). About a third of households own televisions, and about a sixth have telephone connections.
While agriculture is the primary source of income for 80 percent of households, most households (69 percent) rely on more than one source of income.
Given the large number of landless households as well as the small size of land holdings, agricultural wage labour is an important component of the livelihood basket for most people. These features are also conducive to high labour force participation for women. Most women in our study participate in economic activities and this is true even for women from landowning households many of whom often combine work on family fields with wage work.
A striking feature of the village and the district is the highly unequal sex ratio in the age group 0-6 years. Tamil Nadu is a recent entrant on the list of Indian states with high female deficit (see Chunkath & Athreya, 1997 Premi, 2001 ) and within the state, Salem district has the lowest 0-6 sex ratio of 851 girls per 1,000 boys 
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The expectation of a burdensome dowry is reported as one of the main reasons for the recent spread of female infanticide and sex selective abortion. Indeed, the practice of dowry in the study village has undergone several changes. 14 Among the upper castes the amount of dowry has risen substantially while at the same time it has spread to other castes in the village, which hitherto did not practice dowry. While the amount of dowry is strongly linked to caste (higher the caste the larger the dowry), the practice has become universal and the general perception is that it is impossible for a woman to be married without a sizable dowry. The content and the amount of dowry are negotiated prior to marriage and the transaction usually takes place at or before marriage. As a Vanniyar woman put it, whatever comes or not, seeru (dowry) has to arrive in the groom's house before the married couple enter. Even if the ponnu (girl) does not arrive, it is okay, but the pon (gold) has to be there.
In addition to dowry there are marriage expenses. However, unlike north India where a bride's family is expected to bear the marriage costs, in the study village (as in the rest of Tamil Nadu) marriage costs are usually shared between the families of the bride and the groom. 15 Although not widespread in our sample, a recent trend is the emergence of post-marriage dowry-like demands on the bride's family. These demands are made at the time of important events such as the birth of a first child or the death of family member.
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The main exception to the practice of dowry occurs in cases where marriages are choice-based or 'love' marriages. In such cases, there is no dowry payment and the couple usually elopes to get married. 17 However, 'love' marriages are rare and the norm in the village is 'arranged' marriages. Every woman is expected to marry (an unmarried woman is described as a shame to her family) and marriages are arranged by parents and relatives with limited input from the prospective bride and the groom.
Arranged marriages are caste endogamous and it is not unusual for relatives to marry. 18 Cross-kin marriages (marriage to a maternal uncle, cousin, or a distant relative) are quite common. 19 While such marriages still take place, they are on the decline among the younger generation across all castes with a growing trend towards marrying a pudhu sondam, a new relative, as unrelated marriages are referred to. This trend indicates not only a changing preference in marrying outside the kin group but also a shortage in marriageable kin. Whether related or unrelated, the main criteria used to determine matches and dowries are economic status and horoscope compatibility. In the words of a KV Gounder woman, First wealth compatibility and then horoscope compatibility. No marriage is possible if these two do not match, even among close relatives. 15 In 56 percent of the marriages costs were equally shared, in 11 percent all expenses were met by the groom's family, in another 11 percent all costs were met by the bride's family and in 18 percent a majority of the costs were borne by the groom's family. 16 In 15 percent of the cases in our sample there were demands after marriage. 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE -A CHARACTERIZATION AND HYPOTHESES
This section provides an analytical narrative designed to aid interpretation of our empirical work. After setting out the relationship between domestic violence and women's welfare, we develop a characterization of domestic violence which draws on discussions with women, their remarks during focus group discussions, life-histories of key respondents and responses to structured questionnaires.
Domestic violence is an important aspect of women's welfare. It has severe health (physical and psychological) and social consequences for women (WHO, 2002) . Various studies have shown (Carrillo, 1992; Heise et al., 1994; Menon-Sen and Shiva Kumar, 2001; Morrison and Orlando, 1999; UNICEF, 2000) the large economic and social costs of domestic violence. Violence or even the threat of violence constrains the choices women make and restricts their participation in development, thus, preventing them from realizing their full potential (ICRW, 1999 (ICRW, , 2000 (ICRW, & 2002 .
It also undermines their confidence and self-esteem. As an outcome of gender asymmetries, marital violence exposes women's vulnerability particularly in a context where marriage is non-negotiable and leaving a bad marriage is often not an option. 20 The wife takes up residence with the husband and (with or near) his parental family (Agarwal, 1994: 506) . The use of violence against transgression (of male authority, acceptable gender roles and women's behaviour) and as a way of ensuring obedience, appears to be justified by women and men. Whether male violence is used to release frustration or against transgression or without any reason, the responses reflect (and even an acceptance of) the privilege of a man to do what he pleases. A noticeable aspect emerging from discussions with most women is their justification of wife beating, 'if wife is wrong', even as there was near unanimity that it was wrong for men to hit women. As one respondent put it, 'if not beaten, some women cannot be controlled'.
(a) A characterization of domestic violence
This reflects the hold of prevailing gender norms especially about appropriate 'wifely' behaviour and the acceptability of being punished if a woman does not perform her role as a wife as brought out in the following response of a Dalit woman, They [Husbands] are family elders. We must obey them. If we don't then they will hit…... We don't hit because we cannot… [out of] fear…. respect…… People will say, why women themselves will say -she is indisciplined, that is why she hit the man who tied the thali
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. 25 About 12 percent of the women who experience domestic violence listed economic issues as the main factor underlying violent behaviour. 26 Thali is a piece of gold strung on a gold chain or turmeric thread and is tied around a woman's neck by the husband at the time of marriage. It symbolises her status as a wife.
With these remarks and characterization we begin to explore the expected effects of several variables of interest on the incidence of violence.
(b) A change in household economic resources
Based on the idea of economic stress as a source of violence it may be expected that an expansion of household economic resources, for example, due to an increase in income or an increase in land holding should ease economic stress and in turn reduce violence. In particular, since agricultural land is the key income generating asset in the village, an increase in access to land should be associated with a decline in violence.
While an increase in overall economic resources should relieve the stress experienced by a husband, the source of the increased resources probably plays a key role in determining the relative welfare of the members of the household. An increase in the economic resources of the household, attributable to the husband, may unambiguously be expected to reduce economic stress and in turn to a reduction in violence. A husband's improved employment prospects should exert a similar effect.
In contrast, an increase in household economic resources attributable to the wife may be expected to have an ambiguous effect on violence. While an increase in earnings reduces economic stress it may also introduce additional tension and struggle within the household. In an effort to extract and control the increased income and to counter the threat to the image of the male bread winner a man may resort to violence.
The remarks of a Vanniyar man on the role of a women's self-help group are illustrative of this tension. Talking to one of us he said, the sangam (self-help group) is doing all kinds of things for women. They now want these women to set up a shop in the sandai (local market) to sell vegetables. These things are getting into their head. If they go too far, start behaving smart, [we have to] tell them to go live in the shop.
Thus, unlike the divorce-threat models presented by Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1997) and Zhang and Chan (1999) which predict that an increase in a woman's income unambiguously decreases the level of violence/increases welfare in intact marriages through its effect on raising her threat point, or the separate-spheres bargaining models presented by Lundberg and Pollack (1993) and Suen, Chan and Zhang (2003) which show that even when divorce is not an option an increase in a woman's income increases her welfare, our characterization of violence combined with the context under scrutiny suggest that the effect will be ambiguous.
The divorce-threat models are unlikely to apply in the current context. In much of rural India it is not easy for a woman to leave a marriage. 27 Even if a woman can support herself financially and live on her own, leaving a husband is likely to invite strong social disapproval. Whitehead in her study (1981:109) on the conjugal contract points out that 'the relative power of husbands and wives does not simply reflect relative wages commanded in the labour market'. Regardless of their employment and income prospects, familial ideologies about roles and responsibilities, of society's expectations, may often lead women to continue in a marriage.
Even if divorce is not an option and an increase in a woman's earnings increases her welfare in terms of increased consumption of private and public goods, as in the separates-spheres bargaining models, this may not always translate into reduced violence. Given the use of violence as a way of retaining control it is quite possible that an increase in consumption induced by an increase in women's income is accompanied by additional control-induced violence. This is similar to the possibly ambiguous effects of income on violence as proposed by Tauchen et al. (1991) . Based on a non-cooperative family model, Tauchen et al. (1991) point out that if a man's marginal utility of violence were increasing with a woman's consumption, then he may allow her greater consumption but also inflict more violence as her income increases.
Overall, leaving a marriage is unlikely to present a credible threat to a husband and while the additional earning capacity of a woman may expand the consumption possibilities of the wife and the household it may also incite more violence. Thus, the effect of an increase in a woman's earnings and an improvement in her employment prospects are likely to have an ambiguous effect on violence.
(c) Education
The predicted effects of education on domestic violence are similar to the differential patterns expected for an increase in the incomes of the husband and wife. While an increase in husband's education through its effect on income and reinforced through its effect on his social standing may be expected to reduce violence, the effect of women's education on violence may be ambiguous. To the extent that a woman's education is associated with an increase in income it should reduce violence.
However, her education and awareness may also be a source of social stress for the man as it may challenge the traditional male image. In order to assert his authority, he may resort to violence.
(d) Dowry
There are several channels through which dowry may have an effect on a woman's intra-household status. First, the direct and immediate impact of dowry is an increase in the economic resources (income and wealth) of the marital household. Since dowry is a reflection of a man's value in the marriage market, a larger dowry is likely to enhance the social standing (reduce social stress) of the groom and his family and in turn could pave the way for a smoother marital relationship.
Third, while dowry expands household economic resources, it is also a source of household wealth over which a wife enjoys relatively more control. While the cash and livestock portion of a dowry are usually assimilated in overall household resources, typically, the gold jewelry portion of a dowry is reported to be under a wife's control. While norms vary across the country, in the study village (and possibly in other parts of Tamil Nadu) it appears that women keep possession of a large part of their dowry and have a say over how the dowry is used. About 60 percent of married women in the study village mentioned that for the most part they retained possession of the gold portion of their dowry for their own use or that it had been deposited in a bank in their name. Other uses of the gold were: debt repayment, financing of consumption, collateral for loans and dowry for daughters. The control that women in the study village and in Tamil Nadu may exercise over their dowries is similar to the findings reported in Jejeebhoy (1998) . Based on surveys conducted in rural areas of Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu in 1993-94, she constructs an index of 'say over dowry'. This index ranges from 0-2 with a higher value indicating greater 'say over dowry'. The average for women in Tamil Nadu was 1.53 as compared to 0.62 for women in Uttar Pradesh. Thus, while it does not apply country-wide, at least in Tamil Nadu it seems that women do exercise some degree of control over their dowries.
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A large dowry may represent a large proportion of the wealth of the marital household and it may change the balance of wealth in the marital household.
However, this is unlikely to generate the same control-induced violence as an increase in a woman's education and/or income. As discussed above, by reflecting a man's worth and his family's standing, dowry and a dowry-induced increase in the wealth of the marital household confirm his male image. At the same time, dowry is viewed as belonging to a woman and is socially accepted as her asset. While it may be used by the household as collateral for borrowing or maybe sold in times of need it is usually done with the co-operation of the woman. However, this does not mean that women are free to use their jewelry as they wish. For instance, if a woman wishes to use her jewelry as collateral to avail a loan for herself or her natal family she has to consult her husband.
Forcible extraction of a woman's dowry is likely to draw social censure, particularly from her natal kin who in giving a dowry have 'bought' a right to intervene in their daughter's marital life. 29 Despite the spread of dowry in the study area and elsewhere in south India, the asymmetry between the status of wife-givers and wife-takers is not as sharp as it is in the exogamous context of north Indian marriages. Furthermore, women in south India enjoy not just natal contact but support even after marriage. The culture of village and kin endogamy ensures that the bride is not a stranger to the village (even in case of unrelated marriages) and she can appeal to relatives (including the husband's) to prevail upon him and in extreme cases even seek the intervention of village (male) elders for restoration of her dowry. Thus, 28 An underlying issue here is whether dowry should be viewed as the pre-mortem inheritance of daughters over which they may exercise ownership rights or whether they should be viewed as groomprice transfers over which they have no ownership rights. The appropriate characterization is likely to depend on the context. For example, Anderson (2004) uses data from Pakistan to examine whether dowries should be treated as pre-mortem inheritance or as groom-price. The analysis suggests that in urban Pakistan the groom-price model applies while in rural Pakistan dowries appear to serve as premortem inheritance. 29 Several women believed that providing a large dowry gives parents a right to intervene in crises in their daughter's marital life. As this response of a Vanniyar woman illustrates, Earlier people did not bother about how daughters were after marriage. So [they] did not bother about how much (seeru) they did. Now they do, as is expected, and ask if something goes wrong.
unlike exiting a marriage which is not a credible threat, social censure from one's own community and wife's natal family in case of dowry grabbing can pose a credible threat.
Overall, by expanding the income and wealth of the marital household a generous dowry is likely to reduce the economic and social stress experienced in the marital household. Even though it is a resource controlled by a woman it does not threaten a man. Access to an important source of household wealth, combined with social sanctions which militate against dowry-grabbing strengthen the intra-household position of the woman. Thus, a dowry may be expected to reduce stress-related violence while at the same time it does not generate any control-induced violence.
Based on these arguments we may expect a negative link between dowry and violence.
(e) Number and type of children
If a family does not have the required number of children or more accurately the appropriate number of sons and daughters it is likely to be a source of social stress.
This social stress is likely to manifest itself in terms of a higher level of violence.
Unsurprisingly, there is a strong preference for sons in the village and it is likely that women who have more sons are highly regarded and less likely to experience violence. The opposite should hold for women who have had more daughters.
(f) Excessive alcohol consumption
A number of women pointed out the link between alcohol and violence. In response to questions on the reasons for violence, several respondents mentioned that their husbands resort to violence when they are drunk. In group discussions several factors such as economic and social stress, peer pressure and the availability of liquor, were cited as reasons for drunkenness. For example, according to participants in an adolescent girls group discussion, Men say they drink or else they can't sleep peacefully and work the next day. They say they have too many worries, too many responsibilities…. To summarize, on the basis of the discussion presented in this section it may be expected that women in households with larger economic resources experience less
violence. An increase in employment prospects and income of the man and an increase in his educational endowment are likely to reduce violence. In contrast, improved employment and income prospects and a higher educational endowment of a woman have ambiguous effects on violence. Due to its effects on reducing economic and social stress, its role as a signal of the worth of man and its effect on the intra-household position of a woman we expect a larger dowry to enhance the welfare of a woman and to be associated with reduced violence. Given the strong preference for sons we expect that women who have borne the desired number of sons are held in high regard and are less likely to experience violence. The opposite pattern should hold for women with a larger number of daughters.
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
The hypotheses outlined above are testable and this section outlines a framework to subject our expectations to empirical scrutiny. Let V, a dichotomous variable, denote 
The βs are coefficients to be estimated and ε represents unobservable factors which may influence violence. Based on the assumption that ε follows a normal distribution this equation may be estimated using a probit model. 32 Although gifts at the time of marriage may include a number of other items such as silver anklets, household utility goods, cows, goats or poultry, bags of paddy and cereals, it is not uncommon for women to consider only the gold and cash components of these gifts as dowry. In a number of cases where silver jewelry and household items such as a bed or utensils only were provided women reported that they did not receive a dowry.
The vector X 2 contains several variables that overlap with the variables in (1) but it also contains variables that determine dowry but are assumed not to have a bearing on violence (excluded from the violence equation). Equations (1) and (2) are simultaneously estimated using a maximum likelihood approach as well as a twostage conditional maximum likelihood approach (see Rivers and Vuong, 1988 33 While caste is an important variable shaping gender norms, roles and gender asymmetries, violence against women appears to be a persistent feature across all castes. Group discussions held separately with women from different castes in the study village suggested little inter-caste variation in domestic violence. Furthermore, a number of the studies in ICRW (1999, 2000 & 2002) explore the links between caste and domestic violence. The study on Rajasthan reports that there is 'no significant variation with respect to the caste of the respondent'. Similarly, the study on Tamil Nadu finds that 43 percent of non-Dalit men have inflicted physical violence as compared to 45 percent among Dalit men. On the other hand, studies on Gujarat and Punjab find that lower castes are more likely to exert violence as compared to higher castes. While the link is likely to vary across states and the numbers for Tamil Nadu do not show much caste variation, a shortcoming of these studies is that they rely on a bivariate analysis to investigate the link between caste and violence.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (a) The data
The empirical work in this paper is based on qualitative and quantitative information The structured surveys collected information on wealth and socio-economic characteristics of households, fertility history of each respondent, and detailed information on issues related to marriage, dowry and domestic violence. The information on dowry included questions on whether dowry was given, reasons for giving dowry, amount and form of dowry, the manner in which dowry is being used/has been used, and whether there have been any subsequent demands for dowry.
Information on domestic violence, defined in this study in terms of whether a woman has ever experienced spousal violence, included questions on the incidence of psychological or physical violence, frequency of violence, reasons and reactions subsequent to violence. 34 While most women responded to questions on the incidence of violence they were usually less certain and less forthcoming about the frequency and severity of violence. Accordingly, in this paper we focus on the incidence of violence rather than its frequency. Notwithstanding, their willingness to respond, it is likely that for several reasons even the incidence of domestic violence may be underreported. There is considerable shame and fear surrounding domestic violence, respondents have differing perceptions about what constitutes violent behavior and some forms of domestic violence enjoy social sanction (even) among women. All these factors suggest that our data should be viewed as representing a lower bound of the incidence of domestic violence.
The information collected through the structured surveys is complemented by discussions conducted with individuals and groups of women and men across different castes, classes and generations. The aim of these discussions was to 34 Existing literature relies on two measures of spousal violence. These are: (i) whether there has ever been an incident of spousal violence, and (ii) whether there has been any spousal violence in the 12 months preceding the survey. We tried to collect information on both these measures but it was difficult for the respondents to distinguish between the two measures, and the survey question essentially became, 'have you ever experienced spousal violence?' strengthen our understanding of women's welfare, decision-making, marriage, forms of domestic violence and daughter elimination.
In terms of sample size, the data collection covered 178 adult women who were in the village at the time of the survey but paid special attention to the 145 women who were currently married. For our formal econometric work we rely on a smaller set of 137 married women for whom we have a more complete set of information. 37 In principle we could estimate separate models for verbal abuse only and for verbal and physical abuse. However, due to the reluctance to report physical abuse as well as a comparison of the numbers for the incidence of physical violence from other sources, we decided to use the incidence of verbal or physical abuse as our measure of domestic violence. The implicit idea is that the incidence of verbal or physical abuse is a better measure for verbal and physical abuse as compared to the information directly provided by respondents.
(b) Descriptive statistics
Some of the salient features of these data are discussed below. The average land holding is 1.62 acres, which may not seem too small, but it is deceptive as 40 percent of households do not own any land. Although husbands are typically more educated than wives (four years versus three years) the average education level is quite low.
About 60 percent of women are illiterate while the corresponding figure for men is 44 percent. Thirty two percent of husbands and wives are self-employed in agriculture while the remaining work as agricultural labourers or in non-agricultural activities.
Almost all women are engaged in economic activities and on average wives contribute about 33 percent of the total household income. 38 The average number of children per household is about two. This is relatively low in the Indian context but it is not unusual for this part of rural India. 39 About 24 percent of the men consume alcohol. While this may not appear to be alarming, it should not be interpreted as benign social drinking but as an indicator that a man drinks excessively. 40 Horoscope compatibility is measured as a dummy variable indicating whether the husband and wife's horoscopes were very well-matched as opposed to adequately matched. In about 22 percent of marriages the husband and the wife were very well-matched.
A crucial variable in our work is dowry. The survey shows that dowry was given in 82 percent of the marriages and the main form of dowry was gold (jewelry).
In all cases where dowry was given (146 marriages), gold jewelry was a component of the dowry. In contrast cash was provided in 30 marriages while land was included as part of dowry in 13 marriages. 41 In addition to these items, some form of livestock 38 Ideally we would have liked to use information on the actual income generated by the husband and the wife. However, as is well known, in a rural context in a developing country such as India, it is difficult to gather accurate information on income particularly to identify the income generated by each member of a household. Notwithstanding these difficulties we gathered information on household income but were unable to gather information on the contribution of each individual within the household. In an attempt to get some idea of a woman's contribution to household income we asked respondents to provide an idea of the share of income that they thought they generated (as compared to their husband's). Their responses lie in broad intervals such as contribution to household income is 100 percent, more than 50 percent, 50 percent, less than 50 percent and none. 39 On Tamil Nadu's demographic achievements see Antony (1992) , Kishor (1994) , Athreya (1997), and Nagaraj (2000) . 40 Our survey instrument contained two questions on the drinking patterns of men. The first question enquired whether the respondent's husband drinks or not and the second enquired whether the respondent's husband drinks excessively (gets drunk) every day, every month, or at social events. Except for four cases all husbands who were reported to drink, drink excessively. Thus, at least in the current context, drinking alcohol may be viewed as synonymous with drinking excessively. Rao (1997) makes a similar point in a paper that relies on data from a neighboring state. He reports that 75 percent of men do not consume any alcohol but 'those who do tend to consume a great deal'. 41 Given the extent of land ownership KV Gounders always include cash as part of the dowry. So distinct is this practice that they are also known as petti (briefcase) Gounders. The cash, usually a large amount, is given in a briefcase.
(poultry, goats, cows or buffaloes) was provided in 27 percent of the marriages and household utility goods (usually bed, mattresses, copper or steel utensils, cupboard, trunk) were provided in 65 percent of marriages. In some cases the range of these items included a radio, television, bicycle, and in two marriages a moped. 42 Typically, the most sought after and discussed item in the dowry is gold and discussions usually focus on the pavuns of gold jewelry that were provided as part of the dowry. In our work we focus on the gold and cash portion of the dowry and convert these two items into pavuns of gold at constant 1973 prices. 43 Based on this conversion, the average dowry includes 23 pavuns or 184 grams of gold. There are substantial differences across castes, with the higher castes (Gounders) paying an average of 40 gold pavuns, while the Vanniyars and the Dalits provide average dowries of 12 and three pavuns, respectively. In terms of current prices the average value of this portion of the dowry is about Rs.50,000 which is about two to three times the average annual household income of families in the village.
(c) Domestic violence and selected characteristics
As a preview to the econometric work, Specification 1 and 2 may be viewed as the baseline specifications while the other specifications are presented in the spirit of a sensitivity analysis. Following the narrative provided in the previous section our discussion focuses on the role of household economic resources, the education of the husband, the education and earning contribution of the wife, dowry and the number of sons and daughters in the household.
(d) Single equation probit estimates
The amount of land owned by a household is negatively linked to violence but the effect is not statistically significant. 44 Consistent with expectations, a husband's education -a measure of his socio-economic status -works towards reducing violence. The estimated effect reflects the correlation between education and income which reduces economic stress and the status-conferring effect of education which 44 We also examined the link between women's ownership of land and domestic violence (see Table  A1 , spec. 2). While land ownership is negatively correlated with violence, given that only six of the women included in our regressions own land, it is not surprising that the effect is statistically insignificant.
reduces social stress. A one-year increase in a man's education is associated with a 2.1 to 3.5 percentage point reduction in violence. Notes: The t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. * indicates, statistically significant at, at least the 10 percent level. A Specification 2 includes all the variables in specification 1 and a set of occupational variables indicating whether the husband and wife are self-employed in agriculture, or employed in non-agricultural activities, whether their marriage was a love marriage, an indicator for the type of family (nuclear or joint) and whether a woman is married to a relative. B Specification 3 includes all the variables in specification 2 and a variable indicating whether the husband drinks. C Specification 4 includes all the variables in specification 3, a set of variables indicating the caste of the family. D Specification 5 includes all the variables in specification 3 and a variable indicating whether horoscope compatibility was the main reason for the marriage.
In sharp contrast with the violence reducing effect of a man's education, a woman's education is positively linked to violence. This result persists across all specifications and suggests that a one-year increase in a wife's education is associated with a 2.4 to 3.1 percentage point increase in violence. 45 Based on our characterization of domestic violence, a priori, the effect of a woman's education on violence is not clear. While women who are more educated may have better labour market prospects and may have a higher social status they may also be perceived as a threat to male authority and prevailing gender norms. A man may resort to violence as a response to the perceived threat and to inculcate submission in his wife. The overall effect of education on violence reflects the tension between these two effects and our results show that the control-motive appears to dominate and that women with more education are more likely to face violence. Other socio-economic variables such as the economic contribution of the women to the household and various occupational characteristics do not appear to have an impact on violence and their inclusion does not alter the effect of a woman's education on violence (see table 4 , specifications 3, 4 and 5).
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A man's age at marriage has no bearing on violence. In sharp contrast, across all specifications we find that women who get married at a later age are more likely to experience violence. The results indicate that the effect of delaying marriage by one year raises the probability of violence by 3.7 to 4.4 percentage points. The large effect of this variable despite its low mean (17 years) and limited spread (standard deviation of about three) supports the idea that the socially acceptable age of marriage for women lies in an extremely narrow range. Women who delay marriage are likely to experience more violence for several reasons. Older women may be more assertive, they may have greater awareness and knowledge and thus may be subjected to 45 Rao (1993) and Zhang and Chan (1999) estimate specifications where dowry or women's welfare, are treated as functions of educational and age differences between husband and wife. As pointed out by Edlund (2000) such specifications impose the restriction that the attributes of husband and wife influence dowry/women's welfare in a symmetric manner. This may not be and is certainly not the case in our data and hence we treat violence and dowry as functions of individual traits rather than differences. 46 The manner in which income enters the specification is inconsistent with the theoretical discussion and is a shortcoming in our empirical work. As mentioned earlier we were unable to gather information on the individual income contribution of each household member. However, we do have some idea of a wife's income contribution and we use this information along with information on overall household income to create two income variables. These are the level of the wife's income and the level of the income of the rest of the household. A specification with these two variables is presented in Table A1 , spec. 3. Both variables exert a negative influence on domestic violence but are statistically insignificant. The effects of the other variables are in the same range as reported in table 4.
additional control-induced violence. 47 It is also possible that women whose marriages are delayed possess some unobserved characteristics that make it difficult for them to get married and which is also associated with violence. For example, doubts about a woman's chastity may delay marriage and violence may be used a means to punish her for the perceived lack of this virtue. As discussed by Srinivasan (2005) , while modernization, education and greater awareness have delayed marriage for women they are still expected to get married at an appropriate age. In the study area, parents report that they feel pressure to get their daughters married at an acceptable age and liken the burden of preserving a girl's chastity to 'an inferno in the stomach', which can be extinguished by marrying her off early.
As discussed in section 3, dowry is expected to have a negative impact on violence for several reasons. Consistent with this expectation, regardless of the specification there is a negative effect of dowry on violence. The magnitude of the effect is also quite steady and indicates that an increase in dowry by one pavun is associated with a 0.3-0.4 percentage point reduction in violence. Alternatively, a ten pavun (1/3 of a standard deviation) increase in dowry is associated with a three-four (percentage) point reduction in violence. At the mean, this implies that an increase in dowry by ten pavun may be expected to reduce violence by seven-nine percent. Our results on the negative effect of dowry on violence are consistent with Bloch and Rao's (2002) work based on data from Karnataka (a neighbouring state). They also match the effects reported in Zhang and Chan's (1999) work on Taiwan, that is, a higher dowry increases a women's welfare. Zhang and Chan (1999) find that husbands of women who have brought generous dowries are more likely to help with household tasks.
We are unable to find any evidence to support the argument that violence is negatively related to the number of sons and positively linked to the number of daughters. This may seem surprising, especially, given the importance attached to sons in the study area. However, at second blush this result may not be unexpected.
As discussed in section 2, female infanticide and sex selective abortion are common in the village and it is likely that such practices have ensured that parents have the 47 Regardless of whether education delays marriage or not, it is clear that women who get married at a later age are more educated. The average years of education for women whose age at marriage (N = 66) is greater than the mean is 4.12 while it is 2.26 for those whose age at marriage is less than or equal to the mean (N=72). These differences are statistically significant. 48 We also estimated a specification with a dummy variable indicating that a woman has no children. This does not alter the results. This is not surprising as there are only six women in our data set who do not have any children. 49 To examine potential interactions between duration of marriage and dowry we estimated specifications where we interacted the two variables. The interacted variable did not reveal any pattern. We also examined the interaction between duration of marriage and dowry by running separate models for women who have been married for 20 or more years and those who have been married for less than 20 years. For both sets dowry exerts a negative effect on violence and the magnitude of the effect lies is the range reported in Table 4 . These results suggest that the effect of dowry is durable and does not depend on the duration of marriage. 50 As mentioned in section 2, about 15 percent of the women in our sample reported post-marriage dowry-like demands. Violence or the threat of violence may be used to extract additional payments and refusal of such demands may trigger violence. Accordingly, ignoring such demands may lead to omitted variable bias in our estimates. To examine the effect of such an omission we estimated specifications that included a dummy variable to capture the incidence of such demands and we also estimated specifications where women who had experienced such demands were dropped from the sample. As shown in Table A1 , spec. 4, the incidence of post-marriage dowry like demand is positively correlated with violence but is statistically insignificant. Furthermore, regardless of the approach used, the coefficients on dowry and the other variables did not display much variation. 51 We also estimated a specification where the drinking behavior of husband's was captured by a series of three dummy variables. These indicated whether a husband drank excessively on a daily basis, several time a week or at social events. The estimates of such a specification are presented in 
(e) Simultaneous equation probit estimates
Despite the stability of the effect of dowry on violence it is possible that there are unobserved characteristics that affect both dowry and violence. As pointed out by Zhang and Chan (1999) , one such factor may be the unobserved physical attractiveness of the bride. 52 In such circumstances single equation probit estimates may be misleading. To account for the effect of such unobserved common traits, equation (1) and (2) Notes: The t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. * indicates, statistically significant at, at least the 10 percent level. A Specification 2 includes all the variables in specification 1 and a set of occupational variables indicating whether the husband and wife are self-employed in agriculture, or employed in non-agricultural activities, whether their marriage was a love marriage, an indicator for the type of family (nuclear or joint) and whether a woman is married to a relative.
and appendix A1 display that both caste and dowry have a statistically significant and large effect on dowry. Horoscope compatibility is a key factor in determining marriages and appears to be associated with a 'dowry-discount'. 53 On the other hand, the caste variables support the idea that higher castes pay a higher dowry. As the estimates show, the instruments are highly correlated with dowry. Additionally, tests suggested by Bound et al. (1995) The effect of wife's education is positive, statistically significant and is in the same range as discussed earlier. The effect of dowry is negative and statistically significant but it is much larger as compared to the single equation estimates. These estimates indicate that a ten pavun (1/3 of a standard deviation) increase in the amount of dowry 53 The following case is illustrative. A well-off KV Gounder married his second daughter with absolutely no dowry, and with the groom's family taking care of all marriage expenses. One of the reported reasons for this was that the groom had a 'problem' horoscope. The groom's family had looked for a bride for a long time and when they finally found the 'right' bride, they insisted on an early marriage, with no demand for dowry. The groom offered to deposit Rs.100,000 in the bank necessary for their old age, which he and his daughter turned down. 54 As an additional check on the quality of our instruments we used a linear probability model for the domestic violence equation and carried out a test for overidentifying restrictions. The test statistics recorded a p-value of 0.882, that is, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between some of the instruments and the error term in the domestic violence equation.
is associated with an eight percentage point reduction in violence. In other words, at the mean, a ten pavun increase in dowry would reduce violence by about 17-18 percent.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
On the basis of a micro-level study, this paper explored the link between dowry and inter-spousal violence. While there are several negative effects attributed to the practice of dowry, this paper highlighted one of the reasons why a large proportion of women remain in favour of dowry, namely, the role of dowry in producing security and status for them in the marital household. Our study showed that dowry is negatively linked to the level of inter-spousal violence experienced by women. We argued that in the study area larger dowries reduce marital violence through their effect on increasing the economic resources of the marital household, enhancing the social status of the groom and his family, and serving as a source of household wealth over which a woman enjoys relatively more control. In contrast to the effect of dowry, women's education tends to be associated with an increase in the level of violence.
While dowry-obtained wealth confirms male image, it seems that an increase in women's income and educational prospects challenges a husband's authority, threatens prevailing gender norms and manifests itself in increased violence.
While the study focused on a single village it is likely that the findings are relevant to other parts of the district and possibly elsewhere in Tamil Nadu that have similar kinship arrangements including marriage and dowry practices. In particular, it may not be dowry per se that affords protection but the extent to which a woman owns and controls dowry as 'her' asset that has a bearing on her security. Hence, it is unlikely that a larger dowry will afford protection to women if women have little or no control over their dowries.
More broadly, the results presented in this paper suggest that policies which ensure equal inheritance and property rights for women and programs that help women build and retain control over assets may be necessary in order to reduce their vulnerability to violence. However, any strategy to enhance women's ownership and control over assets, whether through dowry, inheritance and/or employment will also have to confront existing notions of masculinities and femininities that for instance require men to be violent and women to be subservient. Notes: The t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. * indicates, statistically significant at, at least the 10 percent level. A This is the same specification reported as spec. 3 in table 4. Additional regressors in all the specifications reported above include a set of occupational variables indicating whether the husband and wife are self-employed in agriculture, or employed in non-agricultural activities, whether their marriage was a love marriage, an indicator for the type of family (nuclear or joint) and whether a woman is married to a relative. Notes: The t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. * indicates, statistically significant at, at least the 10 percent level. A Specification 2 includes all the variables in specification 1 and a set of occupational variables indicating whether the husband and wife are self-employed in agriculture, or employed in nonagricultural activities, whether their marriage was a love marriage, an indicator for the type of family (nuclear or joint) and whether a woman is married to a relative.
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